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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOGGAN & HALL &
INC., a corporation,

HIGla~s.

Plaintiff and Respondent,;
;

No.

v.

10453

N'ELSON ,V. HALL and RAYMOND C. I-IIGGINS,
Defendants and ..Appellants. :

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by a corporation engaged in business as an advertising agency to permanently enjoin
the defendants, former officers and employees thereof,
i'rom rendering advertising senices to fiYe advertising
<1c(·o1mts, former customers of the corporation, allegedly
'- 1 ilicitul by defendants while in the employ of plaintiff
l'(Jrpora ti on, and for damages resulting therefrom.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The trial court, sitting without a Jury, entere(l
judgments in favor of the plaintiff corporation and
against defendants for damages in the amount uf
$25,000.00. The court, at the conclusion of the case,
announced to counsel, <lehors the record, that he would
not grant the injunction sought; and that aspect uf
plaintiff's case was accordingly abandoned. After entry
of the court's memorandum decision, wh~ch merely
assessed damages without discussion, findings, conclusions and a form of judgment were prepared and signed
on only the damage aspect of plaintiff's claim. Defendants filed and argued their Objections to Findings,
_l\;Iotion for New Trial, and l\Iotion to Amend the Findings, all of which were denied.
RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment in their
favor, no cause of action, as a matter of law; or that
failing, reversal of the judgment and judgment in favor
of the plaintiff but for nominal damages only; or that
failing, a new trial.

STATEl\:IENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff corporation was the outgrowth of a
prior partnership between Edward Hoggan and the
defendant, Nelson ,V. 1-Iall. The partnership was
formed on August 1, 1953, among Hoggan, the def en-
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dn llt Hall and a Robert L. Parkin ( R. 229). Parkin
Jiad since left the orgallization awl is not inn>IYed in this
ad ion ( H. 107). The partnership business was incorporated on )larch 1, 1960 ( R. 229, 107). In September
of HHi3, defendant Higgins acquired stock in the corpnration and became a principal thereof, at which time
tlie name of the corporation was changed to Hoggan
& Hall (~ Higgins, Inc. ( R. 230, 108, 209). Prior to
his association with the plaintiff corporation, the defendant Higgins had been engaged in business for himself
as "Hay IIiggins Advertising Agency" a sole proprietorship; and he brought into the business of the
plaintiff corporation the following advertising accounts:
Safeway Stores, Redwood Nurseries, Grant Auto
Parks, Foulger Equipment Company, Hammond
\Vholesale Toys, :Mountain State Fence Company, and
Pride Oil Company (R. 225, Exhibit 9 P). On Decemh<:>r 31, 1903, the plaintiff corporation lost its largest
~iugle advertising account, the Boise Cascade Corporation ( R 233). l\Ir. lloggan serviced this advertising
a<:count prior to its leaving the plaintiff corporation,
and according to his testimony, this task occupied approximately 75 percent of his time (R. 233}.
On or about the 13th or 14th day of February,
l !W.J., the defendant Higgins requested a meeting with
Hoggan and llall at the close of the business that day
( R. 234, 209, 211, 212, 109, 110, 112}. Hoggan and
hoth defendants were officers and directors of the plaintiff corporation at that time (R. 108). This meeting was
prompted by financial reports that had been made aYail-
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able which indicated a substantial loss to the corporation
for the month of January, 1964< (R. 113, 212), and tlie
prospect of another heavy loss in Ij-.ebruary of that year
( R. 234). Profit and loss statements of the corporation
were introduced in evidence and reflected a net loss for
the month of January, 1964, in the amount of $1,399.32,
and a net loss for the month of February, 1964<, in tht
amount of $4,212.11, or a total net loss of $.5,611.43
(Exhibits 16d, 17d). See the Appendix to this brief.
At this meeting, Higgins expressed to Hoggan his
alarm at the situation and requested that Hoggan take
a cut in salary to which Hoggan replied, in effect, that
he would accept a cut in salary if Higgins and Hall
would likewise reduce their salary equally. A reduction
in personnel was also discussed including the dismissal
of 1\-Irs. Fran Hoopes, one of the account executives,
with the suggestion that Hoggan could service her
accounts. Hoggan refused. Hoggan stated that he was
not overly concerned and could see no great cause for
alarm; and he further indicated that he should not be
penalized by a cut in salary by reason of the loss of the
Boise Cascade Corporation account. 'Vhen asked by
defendant Hall how long he, Hoggan, proposed to continue to draw on his present salary, Hoggan replied:
"'Vell, theoretically, Nels, I could draw it until the
corporation's reserves are entirely exhausted and we
go down the drain." Hoggan, however, indicated that,
"in practicality," he had no intentions to do so. After
Hoggan's refusal to take a reduction in salary unless
both defendants took an equal reduction, defendant
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I I iggius, according to Hoggan's testimony, indicate<l
Jlt' felt Hoggan was entilled to no salary at all because

lie "as not producing any income. Higgins thereupon
;11111 ounced that he did not propose to remain and watch
the compau~' lose money aJHl g\) bankrupt aud that he
1rns, therefore, leaving the company (R. 233-236, 212,
:?13, 113, 114).

On the following l\Ionday, Feb. 17, Hall contacted
sercral of the advertising accounts which he had been
sen icing, namely, Freed .Motor Company, 'Vilson
Transport Supply, and Club l\lanhattan-Hofbrau, for
t lie stated purpose of ( 1) making his routine service
call in connection with their advertising business and
( :! ) to advise them that he had decided to leave the
plaintiff (R. 125, 124). He also contacted Salt Lake
,\Iattress Company on that day. However, Salt Lake
.Jlattress Company retained the plaintiff corporation
as its advertising agent and insofar as the record shows,
was still a client and customer of the plaintiff corporation as of the date of trial (R. 286). 'Vith the exception of \Vilson Transport Supply, the sum and substance of Hall's conversation with the representative
of each customer, namely, Charles Freed of Freed Motor
Company, Alan E. Brockbank of Continental Real
Estate, and Tony IIatsis of Club l\Ianhattan-Hofbrau,
'ras that they were having difficulty at the agency and
that he had decided to leave the company. No solicitalic11 "as made by Hall for the business of any of these
last-mentioned three accounts (R. 120, 122, 123, 124,
12.>, 280, 281, 270, 274, 313). l\fr. Freed, Mr. Brock-
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bank and )lr. Hatsis each, in effect, volunteered tlit
advice, without solicitation, that they would continue
doing business with .:.\Ir. Hall regardless of his le~n·i 11 g
the employ of the plaintiff ( H. 281, 270, 271, 313).
The other advertising account which plaintiff claims
was wrongfully solicited was that of Country .Mutual
Life Insurance Company. On ~larch 2, 196.J., Hall contacted Frank Shelley, the insurance company's representative, and advised him that he had left the plaintiff
after it was an accomplished fact (R. 308, 310). Hall's
resignation as an officer and director of the plaintiff
corporation was effective as of February 26, 196.J., and
as an employee thereof became effective as of February
29, 1964 (Exhibit 2P).
As of the date of trial, Freed Motor Company,
Continental Real Estate, Club ~Ianhattan-Hofbrau,
Country l\;lutual Life Insurance Company and 'Vilsrn1
Transport Supply were being serviced by the def end ant
Hall ( R. 308, 311, 312, 271, 280, 289).
On Tuesday, February 18, 1964<, Higgins requested
a meeting with Hoggan, at which time Higgins announced that Hall had decided to leave the corporation.
Hoggan was further advised at that time that the
defendants had the business (R. 242, 132, 264).
Hall testified that he did not advise lliggins of his,
Hall's, intention to leave the corporation prior to his
contact with the customers on February 17. He also
testified that the decision to contact the accounts "·as

6

his own decision. ( R. 117, 118) . X o prior conYersatiuns
11crc held by defendants rclatin: to Higgins' lem·ing
tlic corporation; and Hail first became aware of Higgins' desire to leave the company when the latter announce<l this fact in the presence of Hall arnl Hoggan
at the meeting on February 1 a, 1964 ( R. 118, 17:2).
On the 29th day of February, Hlti4, the defendants
organiied a corporation known as Higgins & Hall ( R.
108, :W8), and have been employed continuously by that
corporation since that date. There 'vas no contract with
the plain ti if corporation whereunder defendants bound
themselves not to compete therewith after termination;
nor did any of the advertising customers liavc a contract
"hich gave to the plaintiff corporation a11 exclusive
right to handle their business (R. 167, IU8, 225, 2:26,
:248, 249, 250).
lVith the exception of \Vilson Transport Supply,
110 person other than defendant Hall had rendered
a(h·ertising services to the five accounts involved in this
case during the period that each had done business with
either the prior partnership or the corporation ( R. 164,
l (i;j). During the life of each account with the plaintiff
corporation and its predecessor partnership to Dec. 31,
19(ii3, these accounts produced the following average
gross receipts per year: Country l\lutual Life Insurance Company, $1,45.5.36; Freed Motor Company,
~.),li34.32: Club l\1anhattan-Hofbrau, $1,489.18 (this
tigme is a projection inasmuch as this account had been
"·ith the plaintiff corporation only a period of four
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months); Continental Real Estate, $5,110.:W; \\'1Lo 11
Transport Supply, $1,197.'l-! (Exhibit 14p). See the
Appendix to this brief. These accounts produced duringthe year 1964 the following gross receipts, to-wit: Country .Mutual Life Insurance Company, $125.99; Freed
:Motor Company, $10,1-!D.:23; Club .l\Ianhattan-Ilofbrau, $u'l5. l 7; \Vilson Transport Supply, $1,37 4.~Hi;
and Continental lleal Estate (Brock bank), $3,434.3!1;
or total gross receipts of $15,709.74 during 19()4 (R
130, 267). During the year 19()3, these accounts produced their greatest total gross revenue to the plaintiff
corporation: $17,272.35 (Exhibit 14p). Nevertheless,
plaintiff corporation failed to show a profit for the year
1963, and in fact sustained a net loss of $428.5(:) (Exhibit
18<l). Although plaintiff in its Complaint alleged wrongful solicitation of additional accounts not heretofore
mentioned, namely, Etah Automobile Dealers Association and Culligan Soft 'Vater Service (R. 2), the
record is barren of any evidence with respect either to
the solicitation of or the revenue produced by these
accounts. At the time of the termination of the defendants' employment with the plaintiff corporation, the
defendant Hall was being paid a salary for sen·icing
the accounts in dispute in the amount of $1,100.00 per
month (Exhibit lGd, 17d; R. 137).
For the conyenienee of the Court, Exhibit Hp
which reHects the income from each account in dispute
during its life with the plaintiff corporation and its predecessor partnership through 1963, together with a
yearly average thereof, has been extracted and repro-

8

duced in the A ppenclix of this Brief. together with
Exhibits 16d, 17d and 18d.
The principal officers of each of the accounts
allegedly solicited and lost to the plaintiff corporation,
with the exception of 'Vilson Transport Supply and
Country .Mutual Life Insurance Company. testified
unequivocally that their respective decisions to continue
,·,·ith tlef endant Hall after he left plaintiffs employ were
not influenced by the contact made hv the defendant
Hall; and that it would have made no difference in their
respective decisions to remain with Hall had he contaded them prior to his termination with the plaintiff
corporation, subsequent to his termination, or not at all!
(R. 272, 280, 313) As indicated above, Frank Shelley.
representing Country .l\iutual Life Insurance Company, testified that he was not contacted until after Hall
had terminated his employment with plaintiff. Peter
\Yilson, doing business as 'Vilson Transport Supply,
a sole proprietorship, testified that it would have made
no difference in his decision had he been contacted 'vhile
Hall was in the employ of the plaintiff corporation or
thereafter. 'Vilson indicated that he was unable to state
\Yhether it would have made any difference had he not
l1dd any discussion with I-Iall whatsoever (R. 289).
Plaintiff called as an expert witness, Alfred H.
Garrigues, a principal in the advertising firm of Ross
.l 11rney & Associates of Salt Lake City, who was :lllowed.
oYer defendants' objection, to present to the Court a
formula for eYaluating advertising accounts. He had
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used this formula for i11frrnal capitalization purposes at
the time his business tl1at had theretofore operated : 1 ~
a partnership was incorporated ( R. 184, 185). In appl~·
ing this formula, two percentage factors are applied to
the gross annual billillg of an account. One factor is socalled acquisition cost which is arbitrarily fixed at 5 per
cent of the annual billing. The other is the re,·emH'
factor which is 15 per cent of the annual billing (R. 183,
191). An additional factor also to be considered was
what Garrigues referred to as indoctrination costs -that amouni which an agency expends in time to get
the account "off the ground" prior to the agency deriving any benefit therefrom (R. 190, 191). llowever, in
expressing, m·er defendant's objections, a market value
as to a hypothetical account having a gross annual
billing of $100,000.00, Garrigues took into consideration
only the acquisition and the revenue factors (R. 192,
193). That hypothetical account in his opinion had a
market value of a minimum of $12,500.00 and a maximum of $20,000.00 (R. 193).
Another approach suggested by Garrigues is to
determine the average of one month's gross billing awl
one year's gross re,·enue utilizing the 15 per cent factor
to determine the revenue figure. Hence, on a hypothetical account having a gross annual billing of $100,000.00, the evaluator will take one-twelfth of that figure
thereby arriving at one month's gross billing and add to
it 15 per cent of that figure representing the annual
gross revenue therefrom and average the same to arriw
at the value of the account (R. 191, 192).
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The record is completely deniid of any e\·idenct>
11 iili respcet to ( 1) the gross anuual hilling of caeh of
llw aeeo11nts which plaintiff complains were wronufullv
.
solicited by defendants and ( :! ) the acquisition and or
indoctrination costs of these accounts.
~

Garrigues read of these formulae in a work known
as ''Hubel's Account and Agency ~Ianagement Practice" (R. 185); admitted that his source material pro,·ided at least ten different formulas; that Hubel ancl
his associates "can't make up their minds which one to
use themselves"; and that his formulae fail to consider
an agency's ability to hold an account cancellable at will
as a factor (R. 197, 198). He admitted that his so-called
acquisition and indoctrination cost factors yary 11ot only
from agency to agency but from account to account
within a single agency (R. 201-203).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT
"\S A :MATTER OF LA\V TO SUPPORT
THE LO\VER COURT'S FINDINGS THAT
DEFENDANTS SOLICITED ANY ADYERTISlNG ACCOUNT. EXCEPT THAT OF
"~ILSON TRANSPORT SCPPL Y.
Defendants do not quarrel with the general prinl·;p]e of law that one standing in a fiduciary relation to
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a corporation may not, while acting in sueh eapaeity,
solicit customers from that corporation for his ow 11 ur "
competing business. Xiclwls-illorris v. ,_lJorris, li.J. F.
Supp. 691 ( S.D.N. Y. 1959). However, the uneontroverted evidence of reeor<l shows no solicitation of Country l\lutual Life Insurance Company, Club l\IanhattanHofbrau, Coutinental Real Estate or Freed .Jlotor
Company by def endauts prior to their termination as
officers, directors and employees of the plaintiff eorporation. It was stipulated at the Pre-Trial conference
that \Yilson Transport Supply was solicited by the
defendant Hall; and that he likewise solicited Salt Lake
_l\Iattress Company. However, the court is reminded
that the Salt Lake _l\Iattress Company remained with
the plaintiff corporation and accordingly no claim is
made for any loss by reason thereof (R. 286).
Defendant Hall was interrogated at length as part
of plaintiff's case in chief with respect to his conversations with Freed, llrockbank, and Hatsis on l\Ionday,
February 17, HW4, the date solicitations allegedly
occurred. Hall repeatedly stated that he advised these
customers that he was leaving the plaintiff and indicated
that the agency was having internal difficulties, but
at no time did he request the client's business ( R. I HJ,
120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126). \Vhile the trial court was
free to dis belie 1-e Jiall's uncontroverted testimony to
this effect by reason of his evident self-interest, Hall's
testimony was corroborated by the representatives of
these advertising clients who were called in behalf of
the defendant.
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Charles Freed, chairman of the board of Freed
~lotor Company, testified as follows:

'·Q..Mr. Freed. im·iting yom atte11tio11 to the
middle or latter part of February of last war
1 Uu4, do you reeall a eom·ersatiou .with !.Ir. ·Hali
relative to his leavincr
the ao·enn·
then known
/'"!
/'"!
•
as Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc.~
.A.. Yes. I am not eertain that it was Februarv
but I know it was in early Spring about a yea·r
ago.
(.J_. Do you recall where that eonversation took
place?

A. In my off ice.
Q. And who was present at the

time~

A. Just Nelson Hall and myself.
Q. 'V ould you relate the conwrsation to the
Court?
A. 'V ell, he informed me that he and Ned
Hoggan were splitting up. They would no longer
be together.
Q. And in substance what did you say in
reply?
A. 'Vell, I said: 'I'm always sorry to hear
about people splitting up.' But we had always
done business with Nels Hall and it was satisfactorv and I saw no reason why we should not
contin~e." (R. 279, 280)
On cross-examination, ~Ir. Freed testified as follows:

"Q. Did he imply to you that they were divi<ling and dissolving the corporation?
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A. I would11 't say he implied to me that tliry
were dividing the corporation, but stated tl1a t
they were splitting up. They were leaving oue
another.
0

(~. I see. And he did ask you for your businc.'is,
didn't he, at that time?

A. No.
Q. lie did not?

A. No. I had volunteered it." ( R. 281)
Alan E. Brockbank, President of Continental Real
Estate, testified as follows:
Inviting your attention to the middle or
latter part of February, 1964, did you have a
conversation with l\Ir. Hall relatiYe to his leaving
the agency known as Iloggan & Hall & Higgins,
Inc.?
"(~.

A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall where that conversation took
place?

A. Yes. At my desk in my office.

Q. \Vho else was present other than you and
l\Ir. Hall?
A. No one.

Q. Could you relate to the Court what \ms

said at that time?

A. l\lr. llall came to my office and told me
that the organization was going to be divided
and that he and .Mr. Higgins were going to form
a new organization.

Q. \Yhat d'.d you say to him at that
14

time~

A. \Yell, I pretty much took it under :uhisemeut. I wanted to rind out all I eould about it.
But I had made up my mind - I don't know as
to whether or not I told him - I had made up
Ill\' mind that, oh, just 011 tlK basis that he was
sc~·yicing my account awl had been the only one
senicing my account that I would naturally haYe
to stay with him if he had a sound organization."
(R. 270, 271)

On eross-examination, l\lr. llrockbank testified as
follows:
"(~. All right. Now as a matter of fact you
knew in your own mind as a result of this conycrsa tion, that Hall ·was there to get your business for his new organization, didn't you /

A. No, I didn't.
Q. I see. He told you that they were di,·i<ling
up the old agency; is that right1
A. That's right.
Q. O.K. And didn't he also mention to you
that thev
. had suffered a financial loss in J anuarv?
.
A. Not that I recall.
(~.

Don't you recall

that~

A. No.
Q. Do you haYe information to that effect

now?

A. I haYe been listening to it here in court,

yes.

(~.

Is this the first time?

.A.. This is the first time."
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l\lr. Tony llatsis, President of the Club ~Ian
hattan-Ilofbrau, testified at the hearing on plaintiff~
application for a preliminary iujundion. A portion ut
this testimony read into the record of the trial below b
as follows:
(~. 'Vhen did l\lr. llall come to you and say
he was forming a new agency?
·

A. l\Ir. IIall came to me I think it was the
mi<l<lle or early part of February and says that
they were going to split, and he asked me what
I wanted to do, and I says, ''Vherever you go,
I want you to handle my advertising. You are
the man that put yourself out for me. You are
the man that has done all this work.' Aud I
wanted him to continue my advertising.

Q. 'Vhat did he say about l\Ir.

Hoggan~

A. Ile didn't say anything except that it came
to a point where they were going to separate.

Q. Di<l he tell you when?

A. No.
Q. And with whom?
A. No." (R. 313)
Frank Shelley, :Manager of Country .Mutual Life
Insurance Company, testified that he was contacted
by Ilall and achised of his leaving the plaintiff corporation subsequent to his resignation as an officer awi
director of plaintiff arnl after his termination therewith
as an employee. Shelley\ testimony, like Hatsis', was
read into the record from the transcript of the hearing
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1:11

:1..,

plaintiff's applieatio11 !'or prdimi11ary i11j1111dio 11
follows:
"(.J. I see. ::'\ow, did :\Ir. Ilall eo11tad \"Oll,
:.\Ir. Shelley, at :111~· time and indil'atl' to y 011
that he was lea Ying the emnpan\· of I loirga;1 ,\
II all & Higgins~
·
,...
0

A. Yes, sir.
(~. Tell the court when that eontact was made~
~ \. That con ta et was made
~larch,

1964.

011

the 2nd of

(~. And do you know a man h~· the name of

Ned Hoggan?·

A. No I do not.
(~.

You don't e,·ell know him, is that correct ~

A. No." (R. 308)
011 cross-examination, Shelley testified in pertinent
part as follows:
"(~. "'hen was the first time you learned, ~Ir.
Shelley, that there had h((':n, well. :.\Ir. II all had
left the agency prior to that~

A. At this telephone c:all on the 2nd of :\larch.
Q. 2nd day of

:.\larch~

A. That was a very brief telephone conyersa-

tion.

Q. I see, that's all."
From the fore;..{oin,~· testim011y. it is dear that on
1:11 11n·;1sion did the defendant II all ask for the business
<11' tltcsc se,·eral adYertising die11ts or solic:it the same.
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Cpon being ath·ised of the fact that Hall was lea\ j 11 I",.
the plaintiff corporati011, i11 each i11staacc, the l'iic 11 t
advised him that they wished him to continue scnieiit,!..!
their respective accouI1ts. These were the u11solil'ited
reactions to the information that Hall was leaving tltc
agency. ~lore importantly, this evidence is absolute]~·
uncontradicted.
lly reason of the professional relationship whil'lt
Hali had enjoyed with these persons over a substantial
period of time, it was only proper that they be ach·ised
of his termination with the agency. I-Iowever, to simpl~·
ach·ise a customer that one is leaving a company fall~
for short of solicitation of that customers business.
Punk
JVaynall's Xeu! Standard Dicti01zar,1; of the
English Language, 1927 ed., defines the word ''solicit"
as follows:

'*

"To ask for with some degree of earnestness;
seek to obtain by persuasion or entreaty; to seek
to obtain something from, by persuasion or entreaty; beg of presistently."
The Supreme Court of the State of California in
the case of Aet1u1 Building 1lfaintenance Company r.
JY est, 246 P.2d 11 (Calif. 1952), had occasion to <letermine this precise point. That case involved an action
for damages against "~est, a former employee of th~
plaintiff, for breach of a written contract which ineluded
an agreement by "'est not to solicit any of the custo11w1"'
of the company seniced by him as an employee for a
period of two years after termination of his employ-
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llll'lll.

pn'llll'

l 11 ren°rsiI1g the trial l'(Jlll't. the California SuCourt stated as follows:
"C011sideriBg the charµ·e of solieitatio11, i11 the
ligltl most fanirabk to the li11di11gs, the most
shmn1 by the eYide!ll'e i.-.. that \\'est informed
.Aetlla 's elie~1ts of the krmi1iatioI1 of his emµloyment and Ins pla11-; ~'' go into business for himself. Ile also eagerly aeeepted business from
...:\dna 's customers when it was offered to him.,.

*

*

*

*

*

*

,. \\'est had the right to a<h ise Aetna 's customers that he was seyering his business relations
with it and engaging in business for himself."
" ·Solicit' is detinell as 'to ask for with earnest11ess, to make petition to, to endea ,·or to obtain,
to awake or excite to action, to appeal to. or to
inYite.' " Black's Law Dictionary, :3rd Ed., p.
1 tiBB. 'It implies personal petition and importunity addressed to a particular individual to do
some particular thing *** 'Golden ~ Cu. v. J usticcs Court, 23 Cal.App. 778, 798, HO P.+9, 58.
It means: 'To appeal to (for something) ; to
apply to for obtaining something; to ask earnestly: to ask for the purpose of receiYing; to end ea n1r to obtain hy asking or pleading; to entreat,
implore or importune; to make petition to; plead
for; to try to obtain.'
":\Ierely informing customers of one's former
employer of a change of employment, without
more, is not solicitation."
It wa-; stipulatecl at the Pre-Trial conference that
\\' il-.on Transport Supply was in fact solicited hy the
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defendant Hall. \\~ith resped to the other advertisinirraceounts, however, it is respectfully suLmitted that tlil'
uucontrovcrted evidence uf reeord affirmatiYely e~tah
lishes that there was 110 solicitation. Although the trial
eourt is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of
the evidence, he may not arbitrarily disregard the
uncontroverted testimony of credible witnesses . .I one.\
['. California Pacli·iny Curp., 121 Utah 612, lil9, :?44
P.2d (3J.0. It is respectfully submitted that the action
of the trial court in finding solicitation of Freed ~1Iotor
Company, Continental Real Estate, Country .:\lutual
Life Insurance Company, and Club l\Ianhattan-Hot'brau, as refiected in Paragraph 9 of its Findings of
Fact and Paragraph 2 of its Conclusions of Lnw (H.
23, 25), was in arbitrary disregard of the uncontro\·erted evidence on this issue.

POINT II.
THE EYIDE~CE IS INSUFFICIENT AS
A l\IATTER OF LA 'V TO SUPPORT THE
LO,VER COURT'S FINDINGS TI-IAT THE
DEFENDANT I-IIGGINS PARTICIPATED
IN THE COl\G\IISSION OF THE TOUT
AGAINST PLAINTIFF.
The Pre-Tri~d Order entered below (R. 18) franml
plaintiff's contention and the issue for determinatio11
by the trial court in the following language:
" ... , it being the plaintiff's contention that
while the defendants were in the employ of the
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plaintiff, they eonspircd and agreed to<rethn to
~olil'it the aL'l'Ollllts of the plaintiff anJ°'to enter
into a business bJ themseh·es separate and apart
from the plaintiff."

*

*

*

"The questions for the trial eourt to determine
are:
l. 'Vas there a rn11spirae~· between Higgins
and Hall while still i11 the employment of the
plaintiff?

2. If there was a conspiracy, did the defendants solicit the plaintiffs accounts while still m
the employ of the plaintiff?"

*

*

*

The trial eourt made the following findings in its
Fi11di11gs of Fact and Conclusions of Law ( H. :!4) :
"10. Defendant. Raymond Higgins. was
aware of these solicitations by l\Ir. Hall and actually assisted l\Ir. Hall in his plan to take the
accounts with him when he left the plaintiff and
both he and l\Ir. Hall testified that an account
belonged to the person who could control it."

The only e\·idence adduced by the plaintiff with
n·"Jl}.~:t to the defendant II iggins' participation in the
:dirged solicitation of the yarious ach·ertising clients,
11 hiC'h as the record clearly shows, occurred 011 )londay,
the l ith clav
. of Februarv,
. HHH, was the testimony. of
1lic two defendants themseh-es. Those portions of def enda11 t Higgins' testimony pertinent to this issue haYc
ht·cn <'-" t ractecl from the record as follows:
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Did you ha Ye a meeting with )lr. I I all
before this meeting of the 18th "·hid1 the thrtl·
of you attended?
"(~.

A. If you want to cali a conYersation a meeting, yes. I had a conYersation with him.
All right. O.K. Now, what I want to know
is what was discussed between you concerning
both of you leaYing the agency.
(~.

A. lly the 18th, that following Tuesday, I
was aware that it was Nels' desire to lea Ye the
agency too.

Q. He expressed that to you before you had
your meeting with l-Ioggan; is that right?

A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now did the subject matter of
any of the agency accounts come up in your conversation with .Mr. Hall before this meeting of
the 18th?

A. Yes. \Ye discussed some of the clients.

Q. All right, tell me what was said by )lr.
Hall and by you during these informal conYersations.
A. \V ell, he contacted some of the clients h~
had been servicing and told me that it looked
like seYeral of them would come along with him.

Q. I see. llefore he made the statement to you
that he had accounts that would go with him, had
.you discussed with him the idea of .you and he
forming a new agency?
A. No. At this point we had just talked about
whether he was going to leaye or not.
22

(.J_. \\'as it understood between \'OU that you
would go to get her a 11d form an age1;ey ~ \\'as that
~·our u11dersta11di11g ~

.\. \\'e didn't h:l\e a dis<:11ssio11 of it, hut I
am sure we felt that if he de<:ided to lean.· that we
<:ertainly hand an area of urnlersta11di11g. and that
we woul<l discuss hot h of us lea ,·ing.
(.J_ ....:\II right. X ow certainly ~·ou wouhl not
ha n.· been interested i11 haYi11g him go with you
unless he brought business with him (

A. l would haYe welcomed the opporhmity to
han· him as an associate whether he brought :rny
business with him or not." ( H. :.?1:3, :.?U)

*

*

*

"Q. ::\Ir. Higgins, whid1 of the accounts did
you help Mr. Hall solicit before you left the
agency?

A. Help him solicit 1
Q. Yes.
A. l didn't help him solicit anythi11g.
(~. You went with him to \\Tilson Transport
did you not?

A. Yes, I beg your pardon. \Vith one exception. I went to Pete \\'ilson with him.
(~.

\Yhen was that 1

A. The week following m~r February lath
meeting. I think it probably would be - I'm ~10t
sure whether it was before we had our meetmg
with :\Ir. Hoggan 011 the following Tuesday or
not. It was that week.
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hen you and ~Ir. Hall agreed to fonn
a 11ew ageHcy, didn't you intend that that age11er
have as mueh business as possible 1
·
(~.

\\

1

A. 'Vell, certainly.
Arni you were perfectly willing and agreeable that :\Ir. Hall solicit such accounts of the old
agency as he wished to do; is that correct 1
(~.

A. \\r ell, J was happy to see him contat'!
them and inform them that he was leaving.
Q. And you also c\·cn encouraged them coming along, is that right?

A. I was happy that indications were thal
some of them would join the new agency." (H.
217)
Hall's testimony on this issue is as follows:
"Q. I see. Now had l\Ir. Higgins spoke to
you, prior to this meeting (meeting of February
13 or 14, HW4) about you leaving the agency!
A. Absolutely not.

Q. It had not been discussed between you 1

A. It had not.
Q. Is that correct?
A. That's correct.

Q. \\rhe11 was that first discussed between you,
l\lr. Hal]{
A. :\Iy leaviug the agency 1
(~.

Yes. By Iliggins with you.

A. This would have been after the meeting of
Tlmrsday. ~\lr. llogga11 was the first man who

2-t

asked llll' if I \\as staying or le:l\·i11g. Ill' askt'd
that night.

<.J. i asked yot1 \'. k·n .\1 r. 11 icmi11-.; llll'lltio11t·d
this subject to you~
l"°'I"°'
A. This wo11 ld ha n· been
:\Iornlav.
. I'm not eertain .

<.J. \\'hat did yo11 tell

011

a S1111day or a

him~

• \. I told hilll the lirst time he ;1sked th:tt I
st ill had1i't made up my mind.

(.J. \\ 1 hat did

)"OU

tdl him the seeo11d time~

1\. The second time I told him that I was
Jea,·ing the organization.

(.J. At that time was the formation of the new
agency, a new eompa11y, discussed between you .
...:\. I d01d fra11kh· reeall an\· diseussio11s where
the formation of a 1~ew agene;· at that point was
discussed, no. (It 115, lHi)

*

*

*

*

*

*

A. \\'ell, I'll attempt to. To the Lest of my
knowledge, .:\Ir. II iggins eontaded me the day
following )lr. llogga11 's eom·ersation with me
which would ha \'e heen 011 a Saturday. The Hoggan conn?rsa tio11. ...:\ t which time I told )lr.
II oggan I ha<l1i't decided what I wanted to do.
Un Sunday, to the Lest of my knowledge, ~Ir.
Higgins contacted me a11<l asked if I had made
up my mind :rnd I told him I had1d at that
time. To the best of my knowledge. otl ~londay,
when I contacted the at·cm111ts I sen·iced, I came
baek arnl told Ha\' I had been in toueh with the
aecounts and that.the aceounts were eomi11g with
me ''hen I left the organization. ( H. 117)
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(~ ...:\II

right. \\'liat date was

that~

...:\. This would haYe been a )londay and J
think that da k would ha Ye been the · 17th of
February.
(~. All right. X ow did I understand eorredh
that you told :\Ir. Higgins that you had contade;l
the aecounts, and that they were going with you.
so therefore you were leaving 1 Is that what vou
told him~
·

A. This in effect is what I told him. That I had
contacted the aecounts that were coming with me,
yes.
Q. Now did you then arrange a meeting witl1
)Ir. Higgins to disl'.uss you and he getting together and forming a company?

A. No.
(.J_. \Yhen clicl you next have a c01wersatio11
with him concerning the formation of a new
company?

A. To the best of my recollection, this would
h:ffe been on the following \Y ednesday, and that
would put us up to February 19th.
(~. Prior to this February 19th meeting, did
vou ever have any conversations with )Ir. Higgins where he mei1tioned to you that you should
obtain some husi,;iess and leave -

A. No.
Q. -

the agency 1

A. No.
Q. Ile never mentioned that to you: 1s that
correct 1
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...:\. Xo.
(~. ls it ~·011r lcsli111<111y thl'll that !ht· <k("i-.io11

!11 l'<>lllad the ac,·01111\.., and to st'l'lll't' their b11si11ess was your own~

...:\. Y cs." ( H. I Ii. 118)
l [ is I"l'spcd t'nlly '11h1111l !t-d that there 1s 110 l'\"1il<'tll't' ol' n·l·ord to s1tlisL11tliatt· a ti11di11g that the dde11da1ll I I iggi11s acted in l'Onl'lTt \\'itl1 I I all with respcd
;o 1·01tl:1l'ti11g· the sen.·ral ad\<Ttisi11g dil'nts inniln·d i11
tlw i11sla11t case 011 the litl1 day of Fehrnary. l!ltil.
.\ltl1011gl1 Higgins ad111its ha,·i11g l'o11tadt'd :\Ir. Pder
\\'ilso11 of \\'ils011 Transport Supply. his testimony is
lo thl' <"ffcet that that occurred r/11ri1111 the Wl'ek of the
litlt; and this is substantiated hy \\'ilson's ll'sti111011y
lo the ctl'cd that his initial contact was with the ddc111L111t Ila!! alone (Il. ~88).
The wrongful act constituting the tort which the
rnmt found and upon which it based its .i11dg111e11t 1s
C:\ pressed in its Conclusion of La'' X o. i ( H. i;)) :
--~. Defendants and each of them ,·iolated their
fiduciary duty owing to the plaintiff corporation
a.s officers and dircdor.-.; when thn· solicited and
obtained the adn·rtisi11g al'l'o1111ts of plaintiff
\\ hile still in plaintitl"s employ.''

\\'hilc Higgins admitted]~· assisted Hall in co11J1('l'!io11 \\ ith the solicitation of the \\'ilso11 Transport
:---11pply account. this is the only tortious cornlud 011 the
! ::1 rt <11' the defendant I I iggins J'{'\Taled hy the record.
I I< 11 :1-.; not present at the initial ('()lllad with \\'ilso11
i r:111-.port Supply Company 011 Fehnwry Ii. Ulti ~-
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Ile was not present during any cliscussions whatsonn
with any of the other adn:rtisi11g accounts. lie wa~ nut
aware of the intention of the defendant llall to c01itact
these several accounts on February 17, HHH, until after
the commission of that act. Nor does the fact that he
accepted the business of these various clients thereafter
as a principal in the corporation of l-Iiggins & Hall
constitute solicitation of them by him. Aetna Buildiny
.1.llaintenance Co. v. W o,t, 8upra.
At the initial meeting of the three principals of
the plaintiff corporation on February 13 or 14, HHH.
1-Iiggins announced his intention to leave the plaintiff
corporation. Ile admittedly discussed with the defendant
Hall prior to February 17, 1964, the question of whether
or not Hall desired to leave the employ of the plaintiff
corporation. llowever, nowhere in the record is there
any evidence to the effect that he previously discussed
with llall his contacting the several advertising clients.
As a matter of fact, Hall stated under cross-examinatim1
that it was his idea alone. The applicable rule of law
is laid down generally in 15 C.J .S., Conspiracy, Sec. i30,
P. 1047, 1048 as follows:
"In order to establish a conspiracy, evidenee
must be produced from which a party may reasonably infer the joint assent of the minds of
two or more parties to the prosecution of the unlawful enterprise, otherwise it is insufficient to
prove a conspiracy. Disconnected circumstances.
any one of which or all of which, are just as
co;1sistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful undertaking are insufficient to establish
a conspiracy."
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Thl' fad that the two det'e11da11b di-.l·ussed pnor
Ill FdJrnary 17, HHi4. the determination as to whether
,1r 11ol Hall would go along with Higgins i11 lea Ying- the
:1gcnc~· dol's not establish a eonspiraey between the two
to commit a tort against the eorpora t ion. Both det'cnda n ts were free to le:lYe and engage in a competing
h11.sincss. Neither defendant had an em1>lonne11t
a11ree•
etlll'll t with the plaintiff eorporation nor were under the
disability of a eoyenant not to eompete with the plaintiff
l'orporation. This in itself, does not eor1stitute an aetionahle conspiracy.
111 the case of Co11ti11c11tal Car-..\'a-Var Corp. i'.
Jfosclc,1;, 148 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1944), the Supreme Court
of California was faced with a problem somewhat analogm1s with that of the instant ease. Plaintiff corporation
so11µ:lit damages against certain of its former employees
for wrongful solicitation of plaintiff's customers. In
n'nTsing the trial court, the court there stated in language applicable to the instant case as follows:
"There is
uphold the
defendants
destroy the

no eyidence in the record which would
finding of the trial court that the
wrongfully conspired to injure and
business of plaintiff."

*

*

*

"That the defendants were free to leave the
employ of plaintiff and engage in a similar business there can be no doubt. For men to agree
a11d plan to enter a business as associates, even
thmwh they haYe a design to draw other patronr•
. l
ag·e from
many
rinds or all that a particu l ar rIYa
ma~· h:n-e, does not constitute them conspirators.
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Pradieally eYery t•o-part11ership, corporation or
pri\'ak i11di,·id11al which enters into h11si11ess does
so with the i11te11t of drawing all the business it
possibility ea11 from all competitors. If it Wl're
not so, there would he no such word as 'eomprtitio11' in business."
Assuming therefore, for purposes of argument
only, that the defc11da11t Hall eommitte<l a tort by reason
of his discussions with the :ufrertising clients on the 17th
day of Febrnary, 1!)(}~ (which defendants dispute) tlw
court clearly erred in finding the defendant Higgins to
have been a party to the commission thereof.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COFHT EHRED IX A"'.AHDING PL.AIXTIFF D.A:\IAGES BECAFSE
THE LOSS SFSTAIXED BY THE PLAIXTIFF, IF AXY, \YAS :NOT CAUSED BY
DEFEXDAXTS' .ALLEGED \YROXGFCL
CONDeCT.
The evidence is undisputed that the plaintiff corporation had no reasonable expectancy of retaining the
achertisi11g business of the accounts allegedly solicited
nnd lost to it. The tmeontrovertecl evidence shows that
hy reason of the relationship and professional eontidell<'l'
existing between the defendant Hall and the a<hertisi11g
accounts in question. the latter would have employed
II all upon immediately being apprised of his having
left the plaintiff's employ. Therefore. the damages. if
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resulting tu the plaintiff resulted 11ot fro111 a11y
;, lil'g"l'd solicilatio11 of these :l<'l'Ollllts hut hy l't':tso11 of
1kl't·nda11l Hall leaving the employ of the plai11till'
t'<>rp<iration.
;.i1y.

\\'ith the exception of \\'ilson Transport Supply
Crn11pa11y. I I all had hee11 the accot111t executin: scn·ici11g· Freed ~lotor C01npa11y. Continental Heal Estate.
Club ~la11hatta11-Ilofhrau. and Country ~Iutual Life
I 11.o.;ura11ce Company, since each had first employed
pla i11 ti ff corpora ti on or its predecessor partnership to
11a11dlc its advertising business. Hall had sen·iced \\'ilson
Transport Supply Company in JU5.t.. awl more recently
J'rom .July of HHi3. The function that an account execulin' performs for the :uh·ertisi11g elient hei11g sen-iced
j.., hest expressed by Edward D. Hoggan 011 crosscxaminatio11 as follows: ( R. 260, 261)
"A. \Yell, he would be i11 constant contact
with the client. Ile would arrange the m·erall
program. Determine budget. Recheck with the
client periodically. Show him development in the
form of :uhertising that he was preparing or
having prepared for the client.
(.J_. As a matter of fact, there is a very close
professional relationship between the executive
awl the cliellt he sen·ices. is there not~
A. There is an intimate relationship established between the account executive and the
client.
(~. I believe, )Ir. Hoggan, when you testified

earlier i11 this hearing you intimated in substance
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the act·ou11t exel'lltin· becomes almost a par[ of
the orga11izatio11 which he scrvil'.es ~
A. That is the intent.
lie becomes rnmpletely i11cukated with the
part ic11 lar philosophy of the client he is attempting to sene 1
(~.

A. Yes, sir."
)lr. Peter \\'ilson stated it
follows: ( ll. :WO)

111

another way as

"(~. (. 'ould you gi,·e the court some idea as to
the training requirements for an advertisillg
ageut to handle your particular account 1

A. \Veil, I think it probably takes an ach-ertising man longer tu become acquainted with the
n1riety of products that we handle and the rnriety
of markets we attempt to penetrate, than it would
in a more, let's say, conventional or popular line
of business and was in a single line of endeavor.
\Ve have n1ried products, appealing to varied
markets, and in our own way - or the way we
want to try to sell our merchandise, which has
proved successful for us - at the time the agency
man becomes familiar with those products, with
those markets. and with the way we want to do
our job, I think it takes longer ·than usual.***"
During the course of the defendants· presentation
of their case in chief. a representati,·e of each advertising
account allegedly solicited by defendants, testified with
respeet to this issue. Peter \Yilson, owner of \\'ilso11
Transport Supply Company testified that if he had been
contaetecl hy the defendant Hall subsec1uent rather than
prior to the :Wth day of February, 1964, the date of
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1kt'<'11da11fs termination with plaintitl' corporatiu11, he
1101rld IH.'\Trtheless han· co11ti1111ed 11 ith the dde11dant
I 1all and sen·red the relatio11ship with the plai11tiil
rnrporation (R. 289).
Both :\Ir. Charles Freed, chairman of the Board of
Freed )lotor Company. and Alan E. Brockhank. President of Continental Heal Estate, likewise testified their
respective decisions to continue with )lr. Hall were in
110 way related to any alleged solicitation prior to the
:!!Ith da\·
. of Februarv,
. HW4. lloth :\Ir. Freed and .'.\Ir .
Brockhank testified uuequivocally that it would han·
made no difference whatsoever in their decisions to
remain with l\Ir. Hall had the contact been made prior
to February 2U, 1964, subsequent to February :W, H)ti~,
or not at all! (R. 272, 280) :\Ir. Brockbank stated his
reas011s as follows:

"r

"A.
ell, I would say this. That everytime
we have hired an adn•rtising agency, it has taken
us from months up to years to teach the advertising agency something about the building business, and how houses are sold and how they are
built, and all about them. And especially the new
things we put into ours, and the procedure we
follow in selling them. )lr. Hall had serviced
my account for three or four years and I rlidn't
want to educate anvbodv else. I was too busv.
It was at the beginning of' a new season and I did
not want to go through the process of teaching
a new advertising agency how to operate in
respect to handling our acco1mt.'' (H. :271)
:\Ir. Frank Shelley. manager of Country ~Iutua]
Life Insurance Company. of course was, in fact, con-

33

tal'll'd and ;11h ht'(l 11( Hall's t1·n11;11atio11 '' 1tli pla111, i1 1
t'1>rporal11111 atkr it l1ad i>t't'11111t· a11 :tl'l'Otllplislll'd Lwt 11~ 1
~l:in·li ".!. l!Hii .• \t l1·ast as lo tiiis alT011nl. tlll'l't' \l;t-., 11,
l'\·idt·!H't· to i11dicak lliat l'm11ilry ~l1Ilual Litt· l1i-.111:111n· liad t'\t'll hl't'll coriladl'd by llall ''l11k lil' -.1a,
... till i11 tlw l'lllploy of lhl' p:ai1ititf corporatio11 ( H .. )(i:-..
:1101. lli-, ll':-.li1111>11y i:-. t•xiradl'd t·arlin in this i,ri1·1.
I I is h11..,i11t·..,s l'Olllach l1a1i ill'l'll soll'iy with the defl'11,L111,
llall and lw did nol l'\Tn k11ow Edward l>. llogga1:.
tlw third principal ill\ ohcd i11 the plaintiff corporatiu11
Tony I Iatsis. the President of l'lub :\lanhatL1i'·
llofhrau. kstitied that llil' 0111~· person at tlw p1:i:~it1!:
l'orporatio11 \\ilh whom he had had any contact \\;h
ddt'nda11t I Li ii and he kstilicd in dfrd that \\ hnnn
I lall got's. lw "a rited him to handle his :uhcrtisi11.~·- ·~'lit
t'Xlrad of his precise testimony appears earlier ii; thi·,
hrit'f ( H. :n :!. :na).
The testimony of the scn.'ral :uh-ertising cLrnl-,
lhl'm'>dn·s with l'l''>IH.Tt to this issue is completely 1111l'<>ntronTkd. ~lorcmcr. there is nothing in the rl'l·or:l
or othtTwisc that \\011ld indicate that a11y of these mc1:.
all of who111 an· respected memlwrs of the business culllllHll1ity. would come ii1to court aIHl under oath pcr_ju:··
tht·mst·ln·s with rt'spcd to this question. Indeed. tlt1
t r;;tl court rdust·d t'\Tll to make a finding 011 this 1.-.--ut.
"hid1 failure will Ill' t'Xplorcd i11 a separate point 11 ;·
after.
l t is. tllt'rcfon·. aln111da11tl~· clear that the l'ausa[i1 ,·
fal'l11r i11 the lo"" ul' phi11tit1' ()f the~c :tt•co1mts "a-, !'.•il

alkged solicilatiu11s made hy Hall. hut rather thl'
t l1i-.1· prol'cs . . . io11al relationship that dde11da11t Hall cu.Ill.' t·d wtih each account. 1 t is apparent that wheresut 1 l'l' '' c11t the ddenda11t I lall. so went thest: al'l'ounts.
Like any ca pa Lie husi11ess11ia11. eaeh of these witnesses
dt>sired a competent skilled adnTtisi11g excetilin· arnil:1hlt: to perform such adnTtising sen·iees as tl1n· may
n·qllirt:; awl it was oln·iously immaterial whether sueh
:1 Jlt'l's<>ll remaine<l with the plaintiff corporation, assoeiall'd with the defendant II iggins in a 11ew eompany or
t'stahlishcd an independent ageney by himself. The
professional trnst all<l contidem'l' reposed i11 the defendant I lall by these rnrious adYertising clients is 1m1ch
the same as that eon fidenee which ex is ts het ween a
lawyer-client or a doctor-patient. The entity or association with whid1 the indiYidual practitioner is assoeiatt:d
i..; of little or no eonsequence to the dient.
:111>

Therefore, the loss, if any, sustained by the plaintiff
('orpora t ion. was not occas i011e(l by an improper solicitation, the tort found, but rather by reason of defendant
Ilall's lea,·ing the plaintiff corporation, which he was
kgally free to do. The e\'idence is dear and undisputed
tl1at neither Hall nor Higgins contractually hound
tht·m,elyes to remain with the plaintiff corporation nor
had either defendant bound himself not to c:ompete
with the plaintiff eorporation after leaYing its employ.
I lad the plaintiff required of the defendants a11 employ1111·11! contrad with an enforceable eoyenant not to eompdc afln termination, then the plaintiff would han:
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lw('fl 111 a difl'('f't'nl p11..,ilio11 lo :-.eek l'l'l'Otll'.'>l' J'n1111 111 ,

l'tJ11rh l'or !Jrl'acl1 of' -.1wl1 contract.
:\citllt'r \\t·n· tllt' ad\lrti-.,i11µ; acl·m1nt-. 111 qtl<'-.1: ..
1111elcr an l'xcl11-.,in· contr:tcl of' any kind whah<H'\l'I' ".,!Ii,
!lit' plaint ill' corp()rali()fl. 'fl1e~· \\TIT free to lean· if' :ti1ii
\\ht·11 tlH'y .'io de-.irt'd \\itl11)1it any re:-.tridirn1-., \\l1a1-,;·
t'\ <'I' and for any rl'a-;011 \\ hatsoenT. Their rcaso11 i11 t 11
i11sta11t ca:-.l' \\:t'i IH'ca11.-;e the dt'fr11da11t Hall kt'l llL
l'l11pl()y of plaint it!' rnrporation - not because they \\tT1
solil'itt'd hy the dl'fr11dant Ila!!.
The l'<t-.t' of Xicli(Jls-Jlurris ( 'urjJ. '1'. JI orris. s1111r11.
1-; of particular appliealron to the facts and l'\ ideii<',·
of tilt' ca-.e at liar. That east' in\oln·d all actio11 hro11~rl11
.'
hy a l'orporation against )!orris. its former officer and
director. for eo111111itti11g a breach of his fid11eiar~· d1it.1·
in allq. ~·<'dly i11d11einµ; cancellation of a \·:t!11ahil' distrilH1torship \\it 11 a eomp:llly known as the X ichols Co1np:111.1.
This distributorship. therdot'on· enjoyed by the plaint ill' corporation wa.-; thereafter awarded to a corporal irn1
controlled hy thl' defendant. )!orris. The dd'enda11t
)lorris arg·11ed that regardJe..,s of any alleged or \\T01l!.,!'f11l ('ond11d 011 hi-. part. the distributorship would li:11(
followed him in any l'\·e11l. The l'ourt agreed and stale'!
as follows:
"Thl' di . . t rih11tor . . hip \\as not for a fixed tenn
of ~Tar .... It ''a" c:11tccll:1hlc b~· the Xiehols CPlll·
pa11~· 11pon fl()til'l'. Tlwre \\as 110 a-;sura11ce of it"
l'nnti1111ity. It ;.., lrnl' tl1at until the mTtrrrenel' of
t lw t'\Till :1 ln·:td~· dc . . nihed. X ichol-; ( '01np:111~·
appeared Iii-ch· to l'oritinue the plaintiff as ih
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national distributor of ·x ichols-.:\liller.· It is
equally true that this prospect of continuaillT the l'orporation opportunity - would remain
only as long as the X id1ols Company was of the
,-iew that the plaintiff had the l'apal'ity to perform as it had i11 the past. This was a matter which
rested i11 the sole j11dgme11t of the Xiehol Company. The record demonstrates that i11 the jwlgme11t of its offieials, plaintiffs ability to perform
to their :-.atisfaetio11 was co11ditio11ed upon the
continued association with plaintiff of .:\!orris
and Block; that as bet ween the two, .:\!orris was
regarded as the more eil'eeti,·e and essential in the
representation of the ~ ichols' interest.
.:\lorris was under 1w contractual obligation to
continue with the plaintiff. Ile was free to resign
as its officer and director. Once he properly severed his relationship with the plaintiff, he was not
restricted from entering into a competitive situation, so long as he did not breach his fiduciary
obligation.
The X ichols Company was entirely free to
make a11 indepcude11t decision in its own interests.
\\'hen the break came bet ween the two associates,
it had the choice of continuing with the plaintiff,
appointing the defendant in its place, or naming
a new designee. But ~!orris, as we have seen,
was barred from interferillg with plaintiff's rights
with respect to the distributorship, because he
occupied a position of trust and confidence toward
It which continued at least until ~lay 11, H)56,
the date of his resignation ... while the law condemns him bee a use his eo11d uet fell be low the
standard imposed and i11lkxibly enforced by it,

Ilic dcic11da11t 11/(/,1/ In· held lia!Jlc to the plaintiff
u11l,1; fur flit danw.<;cs ucrnsioncd !Jy his cunduct.
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Pla11itifl' 111ay Jl()t rc<TJ\ c l'l'l'olllpe11-..c 011 a11y lllirl'ali-..tic lia-..1.-..
<·t·rtai11i:; 11ot ll)J<lll that a<h:111q.j
liy it. 'l'() a<T<·1it pl:t:ni 1;i's claim. \\ liid1 find-.. 1111
support i11 tltl' l'ach. i11 l'll'cl'l \\ould mt'l'l'apit:il11
a c:111cdlalil<· di..,trilJLtlorsliip. 011c that i11 tli•
1111n11al l1azard.., 01· iH1sincss, plai11tifl' would 1111[
han· <·011ti1111l'd to <·11,joy Olll'l' ll1e ddc11da11t \\ itl1d rcw from it.
Tl1t' <'<111/'/ is (111/,11 }Jl'/'.'>'//(/dcd Iha! l'i'l'll i.l·itltu:i/
the d1 fc11tl1111t's i1 d111·c111c11t. Ilic Xicl/()/s Cu1111

}Jflll//. f11/lui.t'i11y !tis /'l'siy11ulio11, in its ml'!/ i11tntsls und uclin!J 11pu11 its Ui.l'll i11dcpc11dc11/ judy111111i. i.t'<111/d !l!li'l' co11cclll'd Ilic dislrih11/orslii11
u11d flit'!ll'dnl ii tu Ilic dlfcndant." (Emphasi~
supplied.)

To the sa111c cll'cl'l. sec the l'Ollllllent of the amwtatur at !I •\. L. lt :!d. :!.>ti, :!.)i a11d cases there cited, \\·hnci11 it is stated as follows:
.. B<'fore nTm·cry ca11 he had for i11terfrrelll'l'
witl1 and loss of a prnspcctin_· husi11c'is rclati()]lship or <'011trad. it i.., held that it must appear
that such relationship or co11trad would other·
wise han· lin:11 cntned into."

X m\ lwn· i11 the rec() rd is there any eYidem·e that
thtTt· existed a rcaso11ablc probability that the plaintitr
corporation would ha n· cont i11ucd to do future husi11c''
with the st'\'lTal :1<hertising clients lost. onee Ilall had
left the c111ploy ot' plaint ill'. "hich he was free to do. 011
tl1t· <'1>11trar~·. tl1l' 111H·ontro\·erkd cYidence of rectJrd
dt·111and..; a directly l'o11trary co11dusim1.
I l is thnl'i'<>rl' rl'spcdfull~· submitted that hasl'd <111
tilt' l'l'l'ord hl'forl' lk· l'l>t1rl. it was l'rror for tlie tri:il
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to ha\T awarded damage.s to the plai11titr eorpora111111. The damage, if any, sustained hy the plai11tiff
,, 11 ·pllralion by reaso11 of the loss of these ach·ertisill,!.{
l'lit·nts "as 11ot the 1)roxi11rnte result of HllY
. alle(J'ed
/""
~1il1citatio11s made thereto.
('<llll'l

POlXT I\'.

TIIE THL\L COPHT EHHED lX .[\\\'AUDI\"(; IL\ :\LH;Es To PLA IXT 1 FF BECA l TsE
(11
ITS A\VAHD \VAS BASED ox (;Hoss
HEl'EIPTS AND IL\LL'S PHESEXT SAL.\HY: .. \~D (~) TIIE CXCOXTHOYERTED
E\'ll>ENCE SIIU\VS TIL\T THEHE \\'EHE
\"O FPTPHE PROFITS TO BE DEHi YED
BY PLAIXTIFF FHO)I THE AD\.EHTIS1.\"(; CLIENTS ALLEGEDLY SOLICITED.
(1)
( )ne of the trial court's glaring errors apparent on
this ~\ ppeal has been the complete omission from its
Fi11dings of Fact as to the manner in which it concluded
that the plaintiff corporation had heen damaged in
t lw amount of $25,000.00 or as to the measure of damage-; a pplie<l by it.
Paragraph 13 of the trial court's Findings of Fact
i~ the only finding made relatiYe to the issue of damages
H. ~.t.). That finding is as follows:
1

"1 a. The a(hertising accounts taken b~· defe11-

da11 ts prodmT all :u.n11al
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.11rr1ss

billing of between

:111.i ·''.!:!.:1110.00 pn ~·<'al'. ~Ir. ll:i!I
:-.<·ni(', .. , tli11 . . <· :1lT1111,1t . . :111<1 dr;t\1-, a .c,al:1ry fr,11 1,
Iii<' 11<''' ('11rp11r:1ti1111 111' Sl.:!.)0.00 p<'r 111u11il 1.
E:1cl1 <lf . . aid :HTrn111t... i. . -.;till lwing· S('nin·d 11"
tlw Ill'\\ <·11qJ<1r:1linr1 111' lliggins ,\ llall. lrtl'..
( E111plta . . i... ..,11ppli('d.1

SIH.OOU.tJO

Th('I'(' i.'> no <·1·id<'ll('(' of record whatsO\'{T with
l'<''>IH'<'I {<l tltc µ:rm'> l1illi11f/ 111' lite :1<hcrti ... ing :tlT<n111h
allq.~·l'dly .'><lli('ill'd and Ltkl'tl. I lmH"n·r. in fairnes-., l11
tl1t· trial rn11rt and to l'<J11n-.,<'l. it is rcl'ognizcd that th(
\\11nl "'hilli11g" in tlti.s finding \\:ts inserted by inach<'l't t'l H'l' a 11d that \\ hat wa'> i11k11ded to he inserted there 11 :h
th(' word "n·,·enue" or "rel'cipis." I lm\'(.'\'l'l', neitl1n ,,
thnl' any n1dt'nl'e of' reeord to '>upport the li11d111.:.:
that till':-.< al'l'<l1111ts produce :111 annual gross I'l'\Tnue 111'
hdwel'n ~18.000 and ~:!:!,000.00 per year. The larg<·-,t
a1110111it l'olkdin·ly produecd by these respcdin· :tl't·o111it.., w:i-.; d11:·ing the Y<':tr l!Hi:~. and that amount \\':h
~li.:!i:.!.:J.) (Exhibit Up 1. Tltc y<'arly rt.'\Tlllle from till·
a<To1111h in quest i1111 a \'l'l'aged ml'!' the life of the at·eo1111t
with till' plaint ill' l'orporatio11 was *u.:rnti.:W ( Exhihii
Up). Th<' ren·nw· prod11t·cd by these tin· :tl't'o1111ts dminµ; thl' yl'ar 1\llit ''a" !-;J.>,70!l.7 i ( H. 1:w. :!ti7) ... \d111itkdly. th<' d('f<'ndant I Lill tc.-.,tili<'d that the approxim:il<
l'l'\Tllllt' d<'rin·d f10111 till' al't'o11nh i11 the y<'ar l!lli:~ ''"'
8 IH.000.00 ( H. 1 :2i \. Yd. cxl1ibit J-t.p. introdul'ed h_1
plai11titl' .... hows !lic 111on· preci...,c figure for J!){i;~ to ht
~Ii .:.!i:.! .:t), a . . . a hll\ « . ., ta led. Tl \l' S 1 H.000.00 to 8:!~ .000.011
tig·un· <':lllH' fro111 tlw 111011th of plaintiff's l'o1111scl 110! !lit·
d«fr11da11t II all ( H. l:!i I. This approximation of pl:li11tiff's t'Olllht·l wa:-. :tpp:1n·11tly v·iz('d upon hy the t'lilll'i

-W
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rh Fiudi11gs uf Fad and the court completely ignored

thH'tlllH.'lltary e\·idu1ce ~Exhibit 14p) as well as the
l'nl·i-.t· test imo11y of both 2\lr. Hall and )lr. Iloggau
rclatiug to the HH).J:. figures (H. 1:30, :!67).

: lil

I 11 any eYeut, regardless of the figure taken relatiug
11 , tl 1c gross reYenue produced by the five accounts in
qt1estio11, the s1g11ifiea11t thing about the eourfs findings
1 ~ that it is based 011 a yross reYenue figure. There is no
ti11d111g of fad relating to the net profits that the eorporatiou deri,·ed or reasonably eould expeet to derive from
the business of the five aeeounts allegedly solieited. This
is wltne the eourt made its most eggregious error. The
l'ascs and authorities abound with the proposition that
damages in a case of this nature must relate to net not
gross profits.
The general rule is well stated in 22 Am . .J ur. 2d,
Damages, Sec. 177, pp. 252, 253 as follows:

"***

Likewise, it is generally held that pro-

spe<:tin· profits from an established business, pre-

Yented or interrupted by the tortious conduct of
the defendant, are recoverable when it is proved
( 1) that it is reasonably certain that such profits
would have been realized except for the tort, and
( :! ) that the lost profits can be ascertained and
measured from the evidenee produced with reasoua blc l'.ertainty. *** l'rouf of the yruss receipts
of the ln1sincss, sta11di11y alone, is not .rnfj'icient."
(Emphasis supplied.)

:--.t'l'.

This rnlc is reiterated in 22 Am. J ur. 2d, Damages,
1iH, pp. :!5:3, 254 as follows:
41

··~ • · Thcn· al'l'. l1m1 t'\ cr. tTrtai11 prinl'iplc., :q,.
pli('alilt· gt·11crally 111 l11~· t'()lllp1!la~i()ll ()f !11,
pr<>fih. Tl1th. 11 lll'tlll r tlw adi()ll j., 111 tort <>r t'11ii
tract. tlw t'\.IH'll.,t'., .,a1l'd ht't':tti.,t· of tll(' \\f'<Ht!..!·
t'td aC'f <>f' ti!(' 1kfr11da1it n111st lw •.itl1t ral'lt'd J'r11: 1,
a11~ n·t'<>\ny. 'i lwrt'i'1>rl'. tl1c plai11tifl' i.., t•11litl1·,1
lo his /It I jJl'ufils J,u/ /1is (',/'jJCCfcd yruss jJl'u///.1
':\'t'! profit. i-. dt'li11cd a., tl1c gross an101111l ih:11
\\ ()11ld ltan· lwt'11 l'l't'l'i\ cd pt1rs11a11t to the IH1si11t·,,
<>r ill\t·.,tnwril tlt:d 11:1-. intcrr11plcd hy !ht· d('dl'frnda11ls· wro11gftd ad ks-; thl' costs of' r111mi110
t l1a t h11si11t·.,s or al lt·11<ling- that i11n.·stme11t. Tl;~
t lwory ht'hind such a def in it ion is tlia t the pla i11titl
t':tr1 rni11i111izt' his damages by not making· 111(
t'\.flt'ndil11rts 11 hid1 1\·mild han.· been required liad
thc 1\r<>11gf11l ad of the defendant not i11ter1T11t·d." ( E111phasis supplied.)

111.I111ai1·1111 Fir,· l'i'()/,·t'/i()ll Scr-cicc i'. H'illi11111s.
a+o J>.:!d til-t. (Calif. .\pp .. l'.l.)\li the plaintiff -.rn1gli!
darnagt·., again.,! ckt'c11danh for Yiolati11g a pernia11e11:
in.iundio11 which re-;lrai11ed defendant from competin,!.!
\\ ith pla111tiff and t'ro1n -;oliciti11g the business of pt'I'sCHl'
who \\ l'l't' t·11st0111ns of the plaintiff 011 and prior ti1
.Ja1111ary ~. rn:>a. the dale that defendant left the empl1 1y
of !ht' plaintitl :111d t'<lg:tged i11 a eompeti11µ; lmsiw~'111 dist'11ssi11g the plai11tiJrs claim for damages. the comt
slated as follows:
"Tht' only eYidcrn·t• perta1111ng to ad11al darnagc., still't'n·d h~- the plai11till' in relation lo tlH
allt·.i.:·t'd 'iolatill:I., hy thl· defendants of the i11.i1111dio11. 1\a-; tl1at it lost ~~-W.00 per year .'1rr1s
in h11si11t'-.., cl j, nlt'd from it IJ\· dl'frndants. 1-'"r
tlw hrt':tt'h ,;f :1 d11i.\· i•1 ('()lllll'dio11 11itli tll(' pl:1i11tifl"" hu.,i,:c-,-.. 1:<1r111:1lh· the mca-;111·e of d:1111ag-.·'
1

-t2

is the loss of profits caused hy the breach.***
Pr()tits. of l'oursc, are the amo1111t of gross int'() Ille lc-;s the amm111t (Ir ('osts. Plaintiff in this
rt'gard only prond the amount of gross profits
it l()st and not the net profits. Plai11ly. the plaintiff did not med the b11rden of }Hm·i11g damages.
The hreal'h of a duty i11 a ntl'llUlll without damage does not 11ormall~· gin· rise to a cause of
action."
(Emphasis theirs.)
111 the case of H'illiu111s i'. lfo11l', :?JH P.:?<l 810
'·Idaho. 1~1.;a) the court there slated as follows:
"If there is any authority to the effect that the
,iury could fix compensatory damages from eYidence showing only gross i11l'ome without deduct ion of expenses and costs of operation, from
which the net profits or decrease in net i11l'ome
l'ould he determined. it has not been called to
our attention.
"The compensatory damages suffered by plaintiff, if any, are limited to the pecuniary loss due
to the wrongful aet of the defendant.

.. IVhcrc a reyular and odahlishcd IJll.Yiness j.y
injured, interrnpted, or dcstro.11ed h,IJ the u.:ronyful acts of another, the 111cw111rc uf damaye.Y, u:hen
and if rccot·cra/Jlc, is the net loss and nut diminution in yro.vs incumc. Hence in the case before
us. if the loss of business was occasioned by the
acts of defenda11t, the measure of damages would
he the loss of profits, if any. resulting from such
wrongful act . "

*

*

*

"In ..Yf/.rnn '1'. OnT.rn1ith. fiB l<laho l, :?01 P.:?<l
i-17. this court held that damages could 11<>t he
pn>dicatnl on proof of gross receipts of the busi-

·U

11l'-.,s, and Ilia! -.,t1l'h l'I idt·ntT, -.,landing alrnw.
111-.t11l'icil'11l proof of dalltagcs ...

*

*

h

*

"'I'll pl'rmit llil' .illr_,. Ill lix tltc a111ount ot' dani:tgl''> from a -.l1owi11g only of gro-.s rccl'ipts i.-., ,,,
tllHT!"lai11 and spt'('tilatin· a'i to what !ht> l<1,,
mig·lit lit·. if any. that it is not a proper niterio 11
in fixing the loss.

"The jllry and this l'ollrt l'annot take judil'ial
notil'l' that a 01w-third, or any other part of gros,
im·o11u· is pro tit.
"\\'e therefore co11t·lude that the le'iti111<1111
tending· to -.,how the l'l:ti111ed and supposed lo~,
of profit-. is in-.11fl'il'ic11 t to sustain the n·rdil'I i1,
this rl'gard." ( Ernphasis supplied.)

To the same cffel'l sec Hoil/hm.L' lslol/d l'roducli1111s
J,td. i'. Lt'ul/.<f, :J.)l P.:!d lO~!l, IO!):J (Hawaii. l!ltiO 1:
Lucl.'i.l'uud Gmdcr C11rp. i'. JJocklrnus, :!70 P.:!d ]!):).
1!1!1 (l'olo .. ]!I.HI; /'t'/. Gfr11u1il/ 1'. lJakcr.i; L~ ('ul//ccli11//tT.ff II'. l'l/iol/ So. fl. lC(i Pae. (iii.>, !ili8 (\\';hli ..
l!lli): Jfr0111/;c1· i'. .\'11(),·uls. ;J.);J P.:!d. :rn8.-t.OO (Idaho,
l!ltiO): ll 11yyi11s i'. (;ra11 Top Doir.11 Farms,:..?/:) P ..!d
:l!l!I. rn7 (Idaho. l \l.) ~); and the mmierous l'ascs :ml
uuthorities cited in lf'il!ia111s 1'. lJol/t, .rnpra. at page 81:2.
The other finding made with respcd to this i.'i''"
of da111agt·s is that the defendant Ilall sen·iees tlw till
adn·rtising :tl't'ot111h 111 question and presently draH-.
a salary fro111 llw ;1c\1 ('orporation of 81.:!.)0.00. ~<'
plat·t· in the l'l'l'ord is it retleetcd hmr mm·lt of tltat salar.1
is atlrih11tahk to the tin· at'l'Ollllts allegcdl.'· .-.;o)il'ill'd.
I Im\ l'\'l'l'. as-.;11111111µ-. arguendo only. that sul'h e\ id~ ill'\

did appear of record, this. in any en:nt is not the proper
11 wa..,111T of damag·es for the Jo..,s claimed hy the plaintiff
l'l1q111ralio11 111 the instant l':t'>l'. The plaintiff ha-. sought,
111 it.., pleadings. compensatory damages for the tort
:ilkgcdly committed hy defendants. The general rule is
-,tall'd in 4 Hestatement of Torts. Sec. HOI. pp. ;;;n,
.i:IH as follows:

"*** In othcr situations. as where there has
been harm to earning eapaeity. the law can indenrnify the plaintiff for a pel'tmiary loss. sueh
indemnity not being the exaet equi,·alent hut OllL'
which approximates the pecuniary harm which
the inj urcd person has s 11 ff cred or is Ii kely to
suffer in the future. In determining the measure
of compensation, indemnity or restitution, the
law of torts ordinarily does not take into aceount,
as do the rules based upon unjust enrichment,
the benefit receiYcd hy the defendant. This purpose leads to compensatory damages."
It is apparent, therefore, that the court based its
rnrwlusion in fixing damages in the amount of !j;~J.000.00
i11 part upon the yros:·; profits of the corporation and iu
part upon the salary that the defendant Hall is earning
by reason of his sen·ices to his new employer. As demon~t rated ahon_>, neither is a proper basis for determining
damages in a case of this nature.
Plaintiff presented ib claim for damages on the
apparent theory that the plaintiff corporation had a
;irnpridor~· interest in these al'<'otmts allegedly solicited.
See l'onclusion of Law Xo. I ( H. ~5). It accordingly
a pproal'hed the probkm of dalllages from the ,·icwpoinl
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of tixing· a \ altw 1Jll llll'..,c a1·1·11111it.., as ii' tlil' ."iallll' 11i·r,
chattt:J.., ('1111\ crkd Ii~· ll1t d1·i 1·11da11h. l n ordl'r to ;i..,,
tlrl' 1·11t1rt i11 ti:xi11g .'itll'li a \·alul', it (Jl'l'.'il'llted ..,0-1·;1!>.;
l'XJlt'l'I ll':-.ti11w11y tlirut1.1...:h .\lfrc·d Carrigue..,, an ad\tJ
ti:-.ing l'.\.l'Ct1tin· of Salt Lakl' City. :\Ir. (;arng1.~· .. , pr1:o.t·11tcd to thl' court st'n·ral fonnulae for detcrmi11i:1·
..,tll'l1 \:tl11t'. 0111' approal'lt \\:ts to take 1.) per eent of tl11.
gni..,.., hilling of the :11·l'1111nt ..,oug-hl lo he e\·:t!11aled pl11'
:, p(')' t'l'ttl lh1Teot' n·prt.·st'llli11g :tl'qt1isition costs of ..,w-J.
a1T111111l as ddi11cd by :\Ir. Carrig11es plus i11dodrinatio:
1·11..,ts liasl'd 11po11 hour.-; spent hy the adn,rtising :tg-1·111
"gctt ing th(' atT011nt oJI' the ground.·· .Another a ppro:tl'l
\\a.; to takl' the an·rage behn·en 011e month's gTm,
hilli11g (a.., di . . ti11g11ishl'd from aet11al reeeipts) and 0111
p·ar's gross rt·n·111w. Both approaehes lose siglii 111' tli~
\cry 11ln iou.., fad of life that the Yalue of any c1rsto11111
lo a h11si11css must he measured by the amount of tll'
protit that rnn he prodtH'('d f11r the business hy tlil'
:tl'l'lllllll Ill' 1·11stomer i11n1ln·1l.
1

,·

.~

'l llt' authorit i q11oll'd abm e amply de1urn1-.;t rak
that 1111· !lle:t..,lll'l' of da1nage.., is the net profit reasonably
Ill h1· expcl'led frolll the aeeounts inn1ln·d. Tlw-,e :tl'1·ou1tl.., l't'Jll'l'Sellit'd \ ariott"I adnTtisi11g <.·11stomers 11tili;i11g the :-.t'n·ices of the plaintiff eorporatio11 from "ho111
plaintiff derin·d l'l'\Tllllt'. .\!though none of tht'st' a1"
t'llllllts \\tTt' 1111dcr 1·011tr:1d with plai11titJ' corpor:ttirn1
and 1·011ld e:llll'cl at 11111. t lwir \ alue of plaintiff can Ill'
11<1 gT<'atn for till' ptll'JH>"l's of this ease than the ,-al1w 11f
tlwir l'Olltral'l11al rclatio11:--.liip. s11l'h as it was. \\·ith pl:ti11
l ill'. Thl' Hes ta tv111t·1it of Torh in its sedio11 011 I>:11111 ..,

. fo

\'ol11111t: -1-. Sec. !111. p . .)il. l'ommc1it "i," la\·s
.
t!11·.111 ! Ill' pn·' ailing rule for ddermi11i11g the ,-:due of a
, , ,,i( rad as follows:
;i"l"
~

l'lll' ':due 111' a l'ont rad is the present Yalue
i1· t hl' 111 I l'.l'}Jff 111 /J/c }JJ'u.fi I to he dn i ,·ed from
the l'Olltract plus till' ,·:due of partial performa11ce
already gin·11 by tlw daima11t a11d 11ot paid for.
This profit is tl1e diffcn·m·t· hdwet'll the amou11t
which probably would he recei,·ed u11der the cont rad and the amount whid1 probably would he
t'Xpc11<ll'd in pcrformam·c. both rcdut'cd to presl'llt worth. 111 some co11trads. the co11ti11gcncics
011 both sides arc so u11certai11 that :tll\" tixcd sum
is a nH.'re estimate based 011 guess. It"so, the rule
as to t'crtai11ty may prcn·11t reeoYery of anything more tha11 nominal damages; if. howe,·er. it
is rt'<1.w11ohl.1J certain that some profit would ha\'e
hec11 rceciH·d, the trier of fact is justified in
a ward i11g· au amount which roughly corresponds
to tht> smallest sum which prohahly would ha,·e
l>C'cn gained." (Emphasis supplied.)
t

.\dditio11al objections to applying either of the
fllrrlllt!ae proposed hy plaintiff's expert are ( l) the
l't'cord is t'ompletely den1id of any eYide11ee reflecting
the gross :1111111:11 hilli11g of each of the fi,·e accounts in
qt ll''i t ion; ( ~ ) there is 110 c\' ide11ec wha tsoeYer with
re . . pt'<'l to the acquisition costs or i11doctrinatio11 costs
,,f t'a('lt of the atTotlllts in que ..,tio11; (:3) its speculatin~
lw('a11se Carrig11t·s admitted that his souree from whieh
lt1· dnin·d his fonmrlae present at least 10 different
t'11r1llldat· and this a11thorit~·. ( Hulwl) itself. has difficulty
11 ddn111ini11g· which one to appl~·; ( 4) (;arrigues' only
1 \

pniu1ct· in determi11i11.i..:· Yaluc of aeeou11ts and for
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which lhl' for1111iial' pn·..,t·ttlcd to the t•ourt was lls!'d 1·. :1,
i11 l'on11l·dio11 with Yalui11g act·o1111ts for purpos(-, 11(
i11l'orporati11g a parl11l'rship: and ( ;; ) (~arrigttl'S hi11h 11
admitkd that :tl'l'o111tls prod11ci11g the grn.ss :1111111;1'
n·n·nut· that thl' :tl'l'<>trnts hl'rl' i11 questio11 prodl!l'(', 11 iti.
all on·rl}(':td factor of -ti', (plaintiff's 1\)():3 O\Tl'IH'ad
fador) plus a salary of $J:L:!OO.OO a11n11ally lo th(' a('l'Ollllt t·xt·ntliH· sen·il'i11g· those :tl'l'ount."i (II all's salary
with plaintiff) would constitute "loss'' aeeo1111ts ( H. :!0:!-

:.?07).

(2)
Thl' court. despite the defendants' ohjcdions t() it'
Fi11di11gs of Fad refused to make a finding with rl'spc('!
to the nd expectable profit to be deri\·ed frolll till'
lll'l'ounts in question. The e,·idem·e before the court ltm1 l'H'I' demonstrates. without co11tradictio11. that there \\t'f,
rw net expeetahlc profits to be deri,·ed from the fhr
alTotmts in question.
From the testimony relati,·e to the e\·ents smT0111Hli11g the ultimate separation of the defendants fron1 thr
plai11tiff corporation. it is ahu11dantly clear that !ht
hasis for the dispute between the principals "as tl1•
snious financial condition of plaintiff. Plaintiff for !hr
two months immediately preceding the resignatio11 11/
defernlants had suffered substantial financial lo."iscs. ,\,
reflected or1 Exhibit I id. the profit awl loss stakmeril
for the period from .January I. HHi-t., to Fehrnar~ :!! 1
1!1ti4. the date of ter111i11atio11 of defendants' nnpl·1~
mc11t. plaintiff sustained a net loss of ~.>.011.J:L Tl1,,

-JS

1>.liihil further rdkets that for the two months imme.t::tll'ly prcl'edinµ; the termination of defe11da11ts' cmpln~ 111t·11l. gr(Jss profits to the plai11tiff were i11 the
:ini•Hllt! ol' *7,:rno.70 and expenses in the amount of
!-i.i.iHli.:W. exelusi\·e of admi11istrati,·e salaries. 111 other
11 prds. the m·erhcad for plaintiff's operatio11s during the
t\\o 111011ths inune<liately preceding the termination of
defe11da11ts' employment arnl the culmi11ation of the
1 , en ls'' hich led to this lawsuit was a staggering se\·e11tyni1tc pn l'l'lll of gross income. For the year I !H>3 (during
"111l'h ti111e plaintiff corporatio11 ,., as senici11g its largest
~ 111 gk a<.Tount, Boise Cascade Corporatiou, whicli cancl'lled 011 December 31, HHJ3) as indicated on Exhibit
J8d. the plaintiff sustai11ed a net loss of $..J.28.5u. Its
ll\"erhcad cxpc11ses, exdusive of administrative salaries,
were ~:H,05:3.(i7 as against a gross profit of $u6,3u2.u2,
or a ratio of m·erhead to revenue of forty-seven per cent.
Ere11 by utilizing the more favorable overhead ratio, i.e.,
forty-se\en per ce11t, rather than the seventy-nine per
1·t·11t incurred during the first two months of 1964, it is
111disputahle that there was no 11et expectable profit to
be dnived from the ach·ertising accounts in question in
this litigatio11 by the plaintiff corporation, as will be
~hortly demonstrated. The chart which hereafter appears
!'11rnishes the court with the gross revenues produced hy
1·:l<'h of the accounts in question during (I) the year
1%:~. 1 ~I the life of the account with the plaintiff corp11ratiu11, and (a) during the year 19u4. E.xhihit l~p
rl'lkds the ren'nue produced yearly by each of the
:l('rnunts. This exhibit also reflects the revenue per year
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:t\Tl':tgl'd (l\t·r the t'lllil'l' lift. ol' l':tl'h :tl'('ount \1ili1
plaint itr ag('ncy.

I,•

Tilt' .\llt-11 E. BrncUlallk .\ccount \las st·n11 '·
hy lilt' plaint if!' agt·twy for a p('riod of;~;~ llHlltlhs. l'11t!',
l ry -'l 11! 11al I ,ifr l 11-,11rarwt· l'ornpany for a pnic1d 11:
i:!. 111oritl1s. Fret'd '.\lotor Company for a pniod <1f l:.!1.
mort!l1s. I lofhrau--'lard1at tan for a pniod of i n1011tl1'.
and \\'ilson Tra11sport Supply for a period of !if,
111(111lhs. Thl' n·n'nw· rcccin·d hy the plaintiff age11t·y
fror11 t·ad1 of llH'..,t' at·t·o11nts anTagcd on·r thl'ir rt'-.,p1·<·t in· lin·s '' ith plaintiff is llil' figure included and n·frrn·d lo i11 col11m11 ( :.! 1 in the cliart hereafter appca1'11I!.
'l'lil'rc is no dm·1111H·nlary exhibit before !lit· t·1111r
with rt'spcd to the ren·nue produeed by eaeh of tl11
at·t·o1111!s for the yl'ar I!Hik IloweYer. the defrndaril
I I all ko.;l ifil'd frorn his ret'ords as to the reYe1111e n·t·vircd
hy I I iggins ,\ I Jail. Inc. from t'aeh aeeount from ll1t
}h·riod '.\larch 1. 1\lti-t.. throug·h December :H. 1!1ti-!
( H. 1:w1. and Edward D. I logg·an testified from pla111·
tiff's rt't'1l!·ds as t1l the a11101111t of ren·1111e produced h~
eal'h of ~1ese an·o1111ts for the months of .January and
February of l!Hi-1- ( H. :.!07).
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( 1)

(2)

(3)

Yl'arl\'

11(

Tl LI '

Producl'd
I

I

i\l'l lllllll

«LI ·11L·.

l!J63

(Exl1 14pJ

Rl'\'enue

A \'l' :agl'. i
O\'er fifr
of account

witn Plaintiff

1964

(R. 130.

267)

<Exh. 14pJ

Rl'al :r~s1aft'
.\Ian r: Brockbank)
<. ,. 1 1111r\ .1lulual Life
J m-uram·t·
f 11 ..ri l\lotor Co.
\ <11111n\·11t~d

11. ,flJr;. u-l\Ianha t tan
\I : !'rn1 Transport
~11p1·IY

TOTAL

, t.:.; 12.tiU

$5.110.20

$3,434.39

1,490.84

1. 4:> -1.36

}) 772.22

4% .38

5.134 32
1.489.18

125.99
10,149.23
625.17

1.200.3 l

1,197.24

1.374.96

$17,272.35

$14.38t.l.30

$15,709.74

.h sho\\ 11 awl reflected 011 Exhibit 18d, the salary
dra 11 rt liy t hc d{'fenda 11 t II a II as of the close of the year

"as ~:!.100.00 per month. ,-\s reflected 011 Exhibit
Ii d. a I the time of the termination of defendant's empl\ 1:.·111m t. the defeudaut Hall's salary was $1,100 per
111(111tli. I ts rather basie that in order to determine
11 lid her or 11ot a net profit was to be expeeted from the
an" 1u11ts i11 q 11estion, one must deduct from the gross
l'l'll'lltws to he antieipated therefrom, the oyerhead
altrihiitahle thereto. together with the salary that the
rp()ratio11 was paying the aecount exeeutiYe serYicing
llHN' a<'l'ounts. l · tilizing the lower o\·erhead ratio of the
• .111 l1tTei11abm·e referred to. that is forty-seYen per eent,
:111d tl1e lower monthly salary for the defendant Hull,
tl1al is. ~l.100.00. its rather clear that there was no net
t °' pn·table profit to be cleri,·ed from the aecou11ts in
·111t·.~tio11 .
J\lli:I

1 11
·

. \ pplyi11g the <>Yerheacl factor of forty-seYell per
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cent to the total income shown in column ( 1) abo"e.
which represents the gross revenue for the year Hlti:),
i.e., $17,272.35, we arrive at an overhead iigure attrih1:lable to those accounts in the amount of $8, 118.00 for the
year. Add to that the salary of Hall for the ~·e~1r
($1,100.00 per month) of $10,:WO.OO, the cost to tlH·
corporation of those accounts for the year would Iv·
$21,318.00. This represents a net loss to the corporatio 11
of $4,045.65, the same representing the difference
between the cost of the accounts and the reYern1c pro- '
duced therefrom.
If we engage in the same calculations with respect
to the yearly average, indicated above in column (21.
of $14,386.30, we arrive at an overhead figure of '
$6,751.56. Adding to that the defendant Hall's yearly
salary in the sum of $13,:200.00, we obtain a total eo.~t
for these accounts to the corporation of $19,!J51.5G. Inasmuch as the gross revenue produced was $14,:38fi.30,
this approach results in a net loss to the corporatio11 of
$5,565.26.

Following the same method with respect to tht
figures shown in column three above, we arri,·c at an
overhead cost attributable to these accounts in the
amount of $7,383.58 . .,.\dding to that defendant IIalh
yearly salary of $13,200.00 we arrive at a total eost to
the corporation for servicing these accounts of *~O.·
583.58. Since the accounts produced gross reve1111e ot'
$1.5,709.74 for the year 1964,, the corporation suffers ~1
net loss of $4,873.84.
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It is eum:eded lhat the salary of defendant Hall,
v:ere he tu have rcma;11ed with the corporation, at the
rate of ~l,100 per mouth eould in part be attributable
to his serYicing of the Salt Lake .Mattress Company
account in addition to those above indicated. 'i'he court
will recall that the defendant Hall, in fact, was the
account executive for Salt Lake .Mattress as well as
those abO\·e indicated, but that Salt Lake ~Iattress remained with the plaintiff corporation. However, Exhibit
Hp shows quite clearly that the average revenue per
year based on a servicing period of 85 months derived
from this account was the sum of $2, 750. 7G. It should
be noted that this figure is higher than actual revenue
produced by this account in 1960, 1961, 1962, and 1963.
Therefore, deducting the lower <fferhead factor of 47%
to this account (but not Hall's salary because deducted
at full amount above), the uet loss to the plaintiff corporation would han· Leen redueed by $1,457.90 in each
of the three illustrations above. The net loss to plaintiff
in ead1 approach would, therefore, have been reduced
to $2,587. i 5, $4.107.:-rn and $a.-H5.94 respectively. But,
there would still remain a net loss -no profit - to the
plaintiff corporation.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that not only
did the trial eourt commit error in basing its award of
damages tu the plaintiff 011 gross, as distinguished from
net, profits, but the trial court erred in awarding any
damage.-; whatsoeHT other than merely nominal. The
reeord co1H·lu.-;iye]~· shows, without eontradiction, from
the best eYi<knee a rnilablc at the time of trial that the
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plaintiff corporation had no reasonable expectancy of
deriving net protits from the five accounts alleged]~·
solicited. This demands a reversal with instructions tu
dismiss or at the least, to enter judgment in fayor ol' tlit
plaintiff for nominal damages only, because auy a waru
of loss for prospective profits is speculative awl uncertain.
One of the leading cases in this jurisdiction dealiug
with the question of damages based upon prospectire
profits is that of Gould v. nf ountain States 1 1elcpho11c
~Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.:2d 802. Although
the factual situation in that case differs from that of the
case at bar, the language of the court lays dowu the test
for determining when a claim for prospective profits i~
unwarranted and any loss resulting therefrom is dt'emed
speculative and uncertain. The court there stated u~
follows:
"The rule of recovery against uncertain damages is generally directed against lllH~ertaint~·
with respect to cause rather than to measure or
extent ....
The rule remains, however, proof of loss of
profits must not be completely speculah :e or uncertain as to fact, although permissible as to
measure or extent and on the present state or'
proof, it appears that the award for loss of prospective profits is only speculative and cannot ue
allowed . . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
1

In the case of Continental Car-Na-Var v. 1llusclc,11.
supra, the California Supreme Court in reversing the
trial court's award of damages there stated as follmrs:
54

"Evidence to establish profits must not be uncertain or speculative. This rule does not apply
to uncertainty as to the amount of the profits
which would ha ,.e beell derived, but to uncertai11 l/J or spcculatio11 as to whether the loss of
profits 7J.,'as the result of a wrong and whether
any such profits n:ould lw1·e been derived at all."
"There is no substantial evidence in the record
to support the findings that the defendants conspired unlawfully, i11terf erred with or deprived
plaintiff of its trade in customers, that the customers list of plaintiff was confidential or a trade
secret, that the defendants used the secret formulae of the plaintiff or that plaintiff suffered damage by reason of the actions of the defendants."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The general rule as stated in 22 Am.J ur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 177, p. 252, quoted above in the argument
under subdivision ( 1) of this Point, to the effect that
prospective profits from an established business prevented by the tortious conduct by the defendants are
recoverable 'vhen it is proved that it is reasonably certain
that such profits would have beell realized except for the
tort, together with the other cases and authorities therein
cited are equally applicable to the argument raised
herein.
During the year 1963, whe11 the largest gross revenue from the five accounts in question was produced
and while the corporation was still servicing the lloise
Cascade at('ount, the largest single account of the corporatiuu, the corporation, nevertheless, failed to show a
Bet prolit. Durillgl' the first two months of the .vear 196-l·'
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the corporation sustained a net loss for that period j11
the staggering amount of $5,ol 1.43. Against the back
ground of these uncontroverted figures, any finding ol
damages to the plaintiff corporation Lasecl upon prospective profits must be wholly speculative and uncertain because based upon the best available eYidenc 1
at the time of trial, there was no reasonable expedanc)·
that profits would have been realized; in fact, <1uitc
the contrary. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that
even if the trial court had a pp lied the proper measure.
that is, net profit rather than gross revenue, it could noi
have determined plaintiff's damage to have been anything other than nominal.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COlJRT ERRED JN FAILING TO :MAKE FINDINGS ON l\IATERLU
ISSUES OF FACT SUIL\IITTED FOR DECISION.
Appellants have heretofore explored at lengtl1
questions relating to causation between the loss claimed
by plaintiff corporation and the alleged tort of appel·
lants. This was framed as a specific issue in the Pre·
Trial Order (R.18). Although appellants respectfully
submit that the uncontroverted evidence of record de·
mands a finding as a matter of law that there was 110
causative relation between the tort allegedly committed
by appellants and the loss sustained by plaintiff corpor:i·
tion because ( 1) the five accounts in question "01dd
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1

l

]J[ne cancelled with plaintiff by reason of Hall's terminatiug his employment therewith and not by reason of
tlie allege<l tort and ( :2) there were no net expectable
profits to Le derived by the plaintiff from said accounts,
it should Le noted by this court that the trial court nevertheless failed to make any finding whatsoever with
respect to these facts.
The reason for necessity of findings on material
issues for decision is well stated in the case of Thomas
v. Claytun Piano Co., .J.7 U. 91, 151 Pac. 543, as follows:
'·... we must assume that the court passed
upon the question of authority adversely to the
defendants contention. That, however, ordinarily,
at least, is not sufficient. The court should find
the facts upon every issue either affirmatively
and negatively, as the evidence may be, and thus
give the defeated party an opportunity to assail
the finding as not being supported by the evidence."

CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY
SUBMITTED that the judgment of the trial court
be reversed and the cause dismissed because the uneontroverted evidence of record establishes that no solicitations were made to any of the five accounts involved
with tlie exception of "Tilson Transport Supply Compa11y, while appellants were in the employ of plaintiff
corporation; and that as to all accounts, including that
of \\'ilson Transport Supply Company, there was no
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causative relation between the acts and conduct of :q1•
pellants and the loss sustained by plaintiff corporati.JJ;
if any.

RESPECTFULLY SUBl\IITTED this :!!Jtli
day of November, 1965.
DRAPER, SANDACK & SAPERSTEI\
By HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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APPENDIX

EXHIBIT 14p (Extract)

~~~~~~~~~1~_1_9_5_4~,l~_1_9_5_5~,:~_1_9_J_6~~1~_1_9_s1~~Li~1-9_6_o~~i~_19_6_1~-1~_1_a_62~-'.~-1-9_63~-''.~T-o_T_AL~---'-~~~:~:v_e~~~~~~;
I

Brockbank ........ .
Country Mutual Life
Insurance Co. . .....
Freed Motor ...... .
Club ManhattanHofbrau .......... .
Wilson Transport
Supply Co ........ .

2,401.39

3,020.09

3,486.33

966.27

(9 mos.)
3,783.05

5,957.50

:.96

961.68

536.30

540.26

3,763.24.1.30
I

6,776.4€

5.567.38

6.800.74

1,281.40 l.53
I

1,094.64

888.76

1,303.lJ

4,312.6C $14,053.15

$5,110.20

1,490.84

$8,732.50

$1,455.36

9,772.22 $51,343.47
(4 mos.)
496.3£
$496.38

$5,134.32

1,200.3]

$9,578.68

$1,489.18
$1,197.24
$14,386.30

EXHIBIT 16d
HOGGAN & HALL & HIGGINS, INC.
STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS
For the Period Ending January 31, 1964
Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. ............ .
Less Discounts ............................ .
Net Sales ............................... .
Less Cost of Sales ...................... .
Gross Profit from Operations

$20,222 3!
6n
8
$20,21561 1
15,351.36 N
$ 4,864.20 1

G

Business Expenses
330.00
122.74
20.00
47.02
1,058.00
553.67
102.34
192.87
56.44
317.74

E

Total Business Expenses .................. .

2 .800.82 ~

Rent ........................ .
Telephone .......................
Postage .........................
Office Supplies ...................
Wages - Employees ..............
Taxes ...........................
Insurance .......................
Depreciation .....................
Automobile .....................
Dues and Public Relations .........

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

$

Net Profit from Operations

Officers Insurance ........ .

f
p

c

'I
F

'

'I
I

2,063.4!

t
I

Administrative Expenses
Officers Salaries
E. D. Hoggan ........... $1,100.00
N. W. Hall ............. 1,100.00
R. C. Higgins ........... 1,100.00

E

3,300.00
162.76

Total Administrative Expenses
Net Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(

3,462 76 (

($1,39932 '

EXHIBIT 17d
HOGGAN & HALL & HIGGINS, INC.
STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS
For the Period Ending February 29, 1964

3,

73 Sales

~Less

....
Discounts

3~
Net Sales
...
···········
- Less Cost of Sales ........... .

2~

Gross Profit from Sales

February 1964

Year to Date

$22,700.71
30.75

$42,923.06
37.48

$22,669.96
20,173.52

$42,885.58
35,524.88

$ 2,496.44

$ 7,360.70

Expenses
Business Expenses
Rent . . . . . . . . . . ...........
Accounting and Legal ........
Office ......................
Telephone . . . . . . . .........
Postage . . . . .
. ........
Wages - Employees .........
Taxes . . . .
. ..........
Insurance . . . ..............
2 Depreciation .
. .......
_ Interest Expense ............
4 Automobile Expenses ........
Dues and Entertainment ..
Promotion MFS .............

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

$330.00
235.00
148.92
115.58
30.00
1,058.00
566.20
36.46
109.53
142.33
32.19
31.1 ;j
150.23

Total Business Expenses
Net Profit from Operations

$660.00
235.00
195.94
238.32
50.00
2,116.00
1,119.87
138.80
302.40
142.33
88.63
348.87
150.23
2,985.57

5,786.39

($489.13)

$1,574.31

Administrative Expenses
Officers Salaries .
. ..... $3,300.00
Officers Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . .
412.98
1963 Income Tax - State . . . . .
10.00
Total Administrative Expenses ..
Net Loss

$6,600.00
575.74
10.00
3,722.98

7,185.74

($4,212.11)

($5,611.43)

EXHIBIT 18d
HOGGAN & HALL & HIGGINS, INC.
STATEMENT OF i~ROF1T AND LOSS
For the Period Ending December 31, 1963
December 1963

1963 to Dai
Sales
$30,842.52
$268,562:
Less Discounts ............ .
15.53
161.i
Net Sales ........... .
-30,826~99
$268JoL
Less Cost of Sales ..... .
24,473_.45
202,038;
Gross Profit
$ 6,351.54
$ 66J62i
Expenses
Office Expenses
Wages - Employees
$1,198.18
$16,342.68
121.74
Telephone .............. .
1,152.88
Rent .................. .
330.00
3,960.00
Accounting and legal .... .
50.00
435.00
35.00
Postage ................ .
304.25
45.69
Office ................•..
1,417.38
Taxes .................. .
1,337.52
56.15
Insurance .............. .
1,088.03
162.68
Depreciation ........... .
1,655.42
Bad Debts .............. .
48.85
Interest Expense ......... _ _ __
212.33
Total Office Expenses ... $1,999.44
$27,954.34
Selling Expenses
Automobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
101.70
1,074.72
Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59.00
1,023.99
1,000.62
Dues and Public Relations. .
456. 7 4
Total Selling . . . . . . . . . . . $617.44
3]99~3
Total Business Expenses.
2.616.88
31,053·
$3, 734.66
$35,308.1
Administrative Expenses
Officers Salaries
E. D. Hoggan .......... $2,250.00
$16,000.00
14,200.00
N. W. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,100.00
5,200.00
R. C. Higgins .......... __2,100.:..0_Q
Total Officers Salaries $6,450.00
$35,400.00
Other Income
(228.72)
Dreyfus Fund ........ .
35.171:
Total Admin. Expenses .. - - - - 6,450.00
Net Profit from
(2,715.34)
Operations ....... .
$
Other Expenses
(78.13)
496.82
Officers Insurance ......... .
69.41
1962 Income Tax .......... .
Total Other Expenses ..... - - - -__( ?8.}_3)
Net Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
($2,637.21)
-

---

-----
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